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Freedom of Speech for Libraries and Librarians*
Rodney A. Smolla**

Noting the recent bicentennial of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution, Professor Smolla considers the role of
librarians in opposing censorship. He proposes a new principle of
"professionalism" to establish the librarian's role, and discusses the
principle in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Board of
Education v. Pica.

The Promises and Perils of the Information Age
In 1991 we celebrated the 200th anniversary of the First Amendment.
This is a propitious time to ponder the future of free speech and the
capacity of librarians to influence that future. Librarians play a pivotal role
in maintaining the free flow of information in American society. Librarians
occupy professional positions that are strategically well placed to help
guide the nation toward enlightened policies for the new information age.
Librarians know as well as anyone in our society the awesome power and
wonderful promise of new information technologies. Indeed, a major focus
of the librarian's professional energy is the intelligent management of this
new potential.
There are, however, some clouds inside this silver lining. The
burgeoning information age places many new "quality of life" pressures
on librarians, including the issues of privacy, quality, and censorship. It is
worthwhile to attempt to sort through these pressures.
Privacy Pressures. Libraries are ideal forums for surveillance. Libraries
can provide a revealing information "fingerprint" of a patron's politics,
religious and ideological associations, aspirations, fantasies, or fetishes.
Libraries may expect increasing pressure to invade the privacy of patrons at
the behest of law enforcement and other government agencies.

* © Rodney A. Smolla, 1993.
** Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, and Director of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law,
College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, Williamsburg, Virginia. This is a revised
version of a paper presented at the AALL Winter Institute, Williamsburg, Virginia, January 31, 1991.
Portions of the article appear in a somewhat different form in the author's book, Free Speech in an
Open Society (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992).
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Quality Pressures. Every day librarians learn magnificent new ways of
multiplying exponentially the quantity of information available to their
patrons, and of multiplying the speed with which information may be
retrieved, stored, or transmitted. This technical potential, however, does
not necessarily ensure any improvement in the quality or social utility of
the information being transmitted. The mere capacity to be informed and
to communicate does not guarantee that humans will inform themselves
well or communicate intelligently or wisely. Law librarians may well ask
themselves, does the quality of justice improve with better law libraries?
Are courts making decisions that are more just than in the primitive old
days of manual shepardizing? Are law library patrons writing better briefs,
memoranda, articles, or books now than they did before the computer age?
Does the speed of thought increase with the speed of information, or is it,
like the speed of light, a constant in our calculations about the impact of
new communications technologies?
Librarians may be tempted to respond to these questions by simply
dismissing them as silly or irrelevant. The "quality of thought," it might be
asserted, is outside the librarian's jurisdiction; it is for the librarian to
provide information and make it accessible, and for patrons to turn it into
something constructive.
The management of new information, including decisions over what to
have in library collections and how to make it accessible, is within the
library's jurisdiction, however, so it is perhaps useful to reflect on the
intellectual process itself. It is useful for librarians to drive home to patrons
the distinction between the seductive decadence of the information ageour awesome capacity to gather information quickly and in massive
quantity-and the human constant that has not changed: the necessity of
painstaking concentration and hard work if raw information is to be made
into something of finished and enduring value.
Censorship Pressures. New communications technologies carry with
them increased censorship pressures. Like art museums, libraries will be
among the repositories of knowledge and culture in modern society that
can expect to find themselves under increasing pressure to serve as society's
censors. In the new information age, librarians must guard against the
censors and the spies both within and without, foreign and domestic.
I hope that librarians will first fight against the censors within and be
forever on guard against that book banner in all of us. We are all prone to
the natural human instinct to censor-to pronounce speech that is
upsetting, disquieting, and offensive as taboo. Librarians, of course,
cannot help but be discriminating in their management of libraries: that is
what librarians do-make judgments as to what to include or exclude in a
collection. But there is a difference between discriminating and
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discrimination, between engaging in good faith professional judgments
about the quality or utility of material vying for precious space and scarce
dollars, and the exercise of judgments based upon political, religious,
racial, ideological, or scientific bias. Librarians must be s(M-critical in
decision making, strive to ferret out invidious motive) and struggle to
achieve the highest level of dispassionate professional judgment of which
they are capable.
In addition, librarians must have the courage to fight the censors
without. Librarians must fight those who seek to destroy the critical role of
the library as the free and open marketplace of ideas, turning it instead into
an arbiter of conventional mainstream tastes and sensibilities. In law, no
less than in politics or culture, one of the great functions of free expression
is to toss speech bombs into the arena, breaking the windows of received
wisdom and rattling the chandeliers of conformity.
The First Amendment and the ''Professionalism Principle''

Librarians are entitled to ask whether the First Amendment provides
them with useful ammunition in this battle. For privately owned libraries,
it is clear that the First Amendment stands as a virtually absolute bar to
government censorship. Other than banning books that are legally obscene,

the government has little constitutional power to dictate to private libraries
the content of their collections.
Unfortunately, First Amendment principles are still in a relatively
primitive state of development with regard to the freedom of libraries
funded with public money. I am disappointed that courts have not gone
further in devising First Amendment doctrines that more fully protect the
intellectual neutrality of libraries.
One of the best future hopes for combatting censorship in public
libraries is the evolution of a theory I call the "professionalism principle."
Under this principle, decisions concerning the content of speech in
institutions such as libraries or art galleries should be insulated from
partisan political influence by committing them to the sound discretion of
professionals in the field. These professionals judge the merits of a work
from perspectives limited to the professional criteria that have evolved
within their areas of expertise. While these judgments will never be
perfectly ''neutral,'' and may well be influenced by political currents within
a professional field, they do provide a measure of objectivity qualitatively
better than that likely to come from political bodies. 1 Decisions over which

1. For example, in 1965, when Congress set out to create the National Endowment for the Arts
and the National Endowment for the Humanities, it employed this principle to ensure that the
Endowments would engage in the politically neutral pursuit of excellence and not be subject to partisan
pressures.
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arts projects to fund or which books belong on library shelves are best left
to the judgment of professionals in the field, and not the micromanagement of legislatures.
This concept of independent professionalism may be prudent
administrative practice and sound economics, but can it possibly be a
principle of constitutional law? Is the precept that politicians should not try
to be art critics, museum curators, or librarians merely a sensible
management strategy, or could it, in some circumstances, actually be a
requirement of the First Amendment?
When a suit is brought claiming that the legislature has interfered with
the professional prerogative of a museum curator or library professional, it
is fair to ask whether those professionals are even the "holders" of the
First Amendment rights at issue. If the legislature employs the
professional, how can the professional presume to possess a constitutional
right to assert claims against the governmental employer to exhibit art
works or library books against the employer's will? The individual artist or
author has not been denied the right to expression, but has merely been
told that the government chooses not to purchase or exhibit his or her
work. To the extent that the public at large claims a right to receive ideas
and information, anyone is free to purchase the book at the local
bookstore, buy the painting, or see it at a private museum. Yet, the public
would seem to have no claim to· force the government to purchase or
display the work. Whatever right the citizen has in this regard presumably
is exercised at the ballot box.
At first blush then, the notion that the First Amendment might require
that professionals be allowed to choose which paintings to display or
library books to keep on shelves seems farfetched. These are, after all,
public repositories of culture. Public librarians and museum curators do
not own their collections; the collections are owned by the people, who
presumably have the ultimate authority to make decisions concerning the
contents of the collections through their duly elected representatives.
On closer examination, however, the professionalism principle is not
farfetched at all. It is well established under existing doctrines that
government is forbidden under the First Amendment from administering
public programs in a manner that discriminates against unpopular
viewpoints. This principle has on occasion been applied by courts to
libraries. In American Council of the Blind v. Boorstin, 2 for example, the
court held that it was unconstitutional for the Library of Congress, acting
in apparent acquiescence to the wishes of Congress, to cease producing

2. 644 F. Supp. 811 (D. D.C. 1986).
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copies of Playboy magazine in braille. The court found that the library had
eliminated . Playboy from its braille program solely because of the
magazine's sexual orientation. "Although individuals have no right to a
government subsidy or benefit," the court stated, "once one is conferred,
as it is here through the allocation of funds for the program, the
government cannot deny it on a basis that impinges on freedom . of
speech.'' 3 To eliminate Playboy solely because of its sexual orientation, the
court ruled, was "viewpoint discrimination," and therefore unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, despite examples such as Boorstin, it will often not be
easy to find proof of a motive to censor. Library boards and other
government agencies may often be clever enough to disguise their acts of

censorship. My suggestion that courts should begin to recognize a
"professionalism principle" is designed to create what might be thought of
as "insulation material" between the legislature and free expression,
helping to combat disguised censorship. There is always reason to be highly
suspicious of interference by elective bodies in the details of content-based
regulation of speech concerning governmental programs. More often than
not, the real motivation will not be neutral, but will be aimed at skewing
the general marketplace through the leverage of government funding. The
professionalism principle recognizes this commonsense judgment of
e~perience and instructs courts to scrutinize with heightened skepticism any
attempt by the legislature to bypass the routine channels of professional
discretion.
The closest the Supreme Court has come to recognizing this
professionalism principle was the 1982 decision Board of Education v.
Pico. 4 In September 1975, several members of the Long Island Trees Board
of Education attended a conference sponsored by Parents of New York
United (PONYU), a politically· conservative organization, where they
obtained a list of books deemed "objectionable" by PONYU. The Board
later discovered that its school libraries contained the following books from
the "objectionable" list: Slaughter House Five, by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.;
The Naked Ape, by Desmond Morris; Down These Mean Streets, by Piri
Thomas; Go Ask Alice, of anonymous authorship; Laughing Boy, by
Oliver LaFarge; Black Boy, by Richard Wright; A Hero Ain't Nothin' But
A Sandwich, by Alice Childress; Soul On Ice, by Eldridge Cleaver; and A
Reader for Writers, edited by Jerome Archer.
The Board had the books "unofficially" removed from the school

library, contrary to the established policy, which required the superinten3. I d. at 815.
4. 457 u.s. 853 (1982).
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dent to appoint a review committee upon receipt of a complaint about a
book. When the Board's actions became publicized, it issued a press release
characterizing the books as "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Sem[i]tic,
and just plain filthy" 5 and stating that it "is our duty, our moral
obligation, to protect the children in our schools from this moral danger as
surely as from physical and medical dangers. " 6
A short time later, the Board appointed a book review committee to
determine whether the books should be retained. The committee was to
consider "educational suitability," "good taste," "relevance," and
"appropriateness to age and grade level. " 7 The committee recommended
that five books be retained, two be removed, and one be made available
upon parental approval. The Board rejected the committee's recommendation and returned only two books to the library-one without any
restrictions and one with parental approval. 8
A suit was brought by students challenging the Board's actions. The

students alleged that the Board removed the books because certain passages
"offended [Board members'] social, political and moral tastes and not
because the books were lacking in educational value.' ' 9 The suit maintained
that the Board's decision was based solely on the fact that the books
appeared on the PONYU list. The Board, after all, did not attempt to
review other books in the school libraries. 10 The students conceded that if
the Board's decision were based solely on "educational suitability,"
removal would be permissible and would not constitute an official
suppression of ideas in violation of the First Amendment. It was precisely
the Board's bypassing of normal professional channels, however, that gave
the students powerful circumstantial evidence that the Board had not acted
on neutral grounds. The Board argued that schools must be permitted
unfettered discretion to transmit community values and that this included
the right of the Board to make its own decisions concerning what was
appropriate for the school libraries.
The Supreme Court's holding was announced in a plurality opinion by
Justice Brennan. 11 Brennan emphasized that the Court's holding was a
narrow one, limited to the removal of books from the school library, and

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

!d. at 857.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 858.
!d. at 858-59.

10. !d. at 874.
II. Justice Brennan's opinion was joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, and in part by
Justice Blackmun. Justice White voted with these four Justices to remand the case to further develop
the factual record, but did not join in the First Amendment discussion of the plurality.
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did not extend into the classroom or apply to the acquisition of books. The
first question considered was whether the First Amendment imposes any
limitations on the Board's discretion to remove library books. Brennan
acknowledged that local school boards must be permitted to transmit
community values through their curriculum, but also recognized that this
discretion is subject to the "transcendent imperatives of the First
Amendment. " 12
.
Justice Brennan reasoned that the First Amendment protects not only
individual self-expression, but also the right to receive information and
ideas. 13 The right to receive inures in the right to send, for without both a
listener and a speaker, freedom of expression is as empty as the sound of
one hand clapping.
Brennan held that school officials do have significant authority to
control the content of speech in schools, but this authority is not
authoritarian; schools may not monopolize the marketplace. Quoting
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, Brennan stated, "In our system,
students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which
the State chooses to communicate. . . . [S]chool officials cannot suppress
'expressions of feeling with which they do not wish to contend."' 14
Justice Brennan noted that students' First Amendment rights are
"construed 'in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment,"' but held that "the special characteristics of the school
library make that environment especially appropriate for the recognition of
the First Amendment rights of students." 15 If the Board intended to deny
the students access to ideas with which the Board disagrees, then the
removal of the books was unconstitutional. On the record before the
Court, however, it was impossible to tell whether the School Board had
been motivated .by an illicit intent to suppress ideas, and so the Court
remanded the case back to the lower courts for a trial on the School
Board's motivation.
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger pointed out that the
students still had access to the removed books through the public library
and private bookstores. While the government may not unreasonably
obstruct the expression of ideas, he maintained, it is not required to be the
conveyor of those ideas. The right to receive ideas does not create a right to
have the ideas affirmatively provided by the government. 16

12. 457 U.S. at 864.
13. /d. at 866-67.
14. /d. at 868 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 511 (1969), quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
15. /d. at 868.
16. /d. at 886-88 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Burger also charged that although Justice Brennan specifically limited
his decision to the removal of books, the distinction between removal and
acquisition is meaningless. "Why does the coincidence of timing become
the basis of a constitutional holding?" Burger asked. Despite these
objections, however, Justice Brennan rightly prevailed, because none of the
dissenting Justices could persuasively refute Justice Brennan's central
thes~s: even if the school district had no a:ffirmative duty in the first
instance to create a school library, once it did, the principle of neutrality
and the corollary notion of professional independence were activated. No
one doubted that it would violate the Constitution for a Democratic school
board, motivated by party loyalty, to ban books favoring Republicans, or
for an all-white school board, motivated by racial animus, to ban books
written by black authors or advocating civil rights. The motivation was
what mattered, and the deviation from professional norms was evidence
that the motivation was suspect.
After the Supreme Court rendered its decision, the School Board
reversed itself, voting to return the banned books to the libraryY This took
the steam out of the lawsuit, and there was no further hearing on the merits
of the case. Whether or not one considers the School Board's retreat to be
an implicit confession of its improper motives, the Pico decision was an
important beginning in establishing the professionalism principle.
Censorship in Private Institutions
It is worth saying a word about private acts of censorship aimed at
private-sector libraries, such as libraries at private universities. The decision
by a private university to engage in censorship is not, of course, subject to
the restraints of the First Amendment at all, because the Constitution
places restrictions only on government. Borrowing on notions of academic,
artistic, and scientific freedom, surely the nation's great private institutions
of learning and culture ought to operate as if the First Amendment applied
to them. The fabric of society's intellectual and cultural life is a tightly knit
weave of private and public institutions. An open society· committed to free
expression as a transcendent value will be committed to principles of
artistic and scholarly freedom in private universities, museums, theaters,
and libraries as well as public institutions, encouraging the free flow of
information among all of them. The life of the mind should not be
cramped by the artificial distinctions of law.

17. Richard Levine & William C. Rhoden, School Board Unbans Books, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 15,
1982, at ES.
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Conclusion

This returns us to the role of the librarian, who can influence our social
respect for free speech in all American institutions, public and private. I
hope librarians will make a profound commitment to maintaining the
intellectual openness of libraries. Let this be a guiding ethos of what
librarians are all about: to fight censors wherever they are found. Fight
them in conventions, in newsletters, on library boards, in bureaucracies.
Fight them in legislatures. Fight them in the courts; fight them in the
forums of public opinion. Fight them because librarians have professional
influence and because librarians matter. Fight them because librarians are
vital players in the never-ending struggle to maintain the free flow of
information in a wide-open and robust democracy .

..

